원자력 및 핵 시설 군사공격의 국제법적 쟁점과 정책적 함의

This study examines the legal and strategic implications of military attacks on nuclear facilities, focusing on the growing threat that North Korea could target nuclear power plants in South Korea. Drawing on recent cases, including Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian nuclear facilities and airstrikes on nuclear-related sites in Iran, the article asks two central questions: whether a conventional strike on a nuclear power plant should be understood as functionally equivalent to the use of a nuclear weapon, and whether existing international legal regimes provide effective protection against such attacks. The analysis reviews the relevant legal framework, including Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva Conventions, the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. It argues that these instruments provide only limited protection because their scope is narrow and their exceptions are open to expansive interpretation. In particular, Article 56 of Additional Protocol I allows special protection to cease when a nuclear power plant is deemed to provide “regular, significant, and direct” support to military operations, thereby creating substantial legal ambiguity. As a result, international law does not categorically prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities but instead constrains them only under specific conditions, leaving room for states to justify such attacks on grounds of military necessity. Nevertheless, international law remains important as a framework of legitimacy, diplomatic condemnation, and political accountability. The article concludes that South Korea should treat a potential North Korean attack on its nuclear power plants as a multidimensional security threat and respond through an integrated strategy that combines stronger physical protection, missile-, drone-, and cyber-defense capabilities, radiological emergency preparedness, international coordination, and extended deterrence.